Climate plans, an instrument for local authorities?
Critical summary of the third hearing, October 28, 2009
By Taoufik Souami, scientific coordinator of the program
This third session provided an opportunity to look at climate plans as “tools” for American States and cities to outline a “global” approach to mobility in relation to climate change.
This session also differs from the first two in that its subject is an instrument that is employed in both the US and Europe, at least in terms of the broad framework of its content. In reality, that content varies not only within Europe but even between French cities. In the US as in France, these documents are in their infancy and few specialists are currently able to define their content in detail with any certainty.
So the climate plans provided the framework for our explorations within the context of a dual exercise: firstly, an (inevitable?) comparison between the first known plans in Europe and those that have been developed in the US; and secondly, an in-depth analysis of the content of the US climate plans.
It should be noted, first of all, that the reasons for introducing climate plans differ on either side of the Atlantic. For Stephen Wheeler, climate plans in the US are not being introduced because of natural catastrophes or disasters. The participants present stressed the difference with Europe, by referring to an idea that is relatively common in France: the emphasis on the “urgency” of the situation, the sense of “emergency”, to give impetus to the introduction of these plans. In Europe, unlike in the USA, the suggestion was that the environmental context and an awareness of the “planetary” issues are behind the spread of these plans. In the US, these plans seem to be a way for politicians to distinguish themselves on the local and national stage, to state their public commitment to THE environmental topic of the moment. In Europe, the impetus behind these plans is top-down, from national or regional to local government level (in reality, certain local authorities have lobbied strongly for the national launch of such plans. Nonetheless, the formal process is top-down). In the US, climate plans are initiated quite spontaneously and freely by States, cities or regional institutions. For Stephen Wheeler, the initiative depends on the motives and strategies of local politicians.
As the session went on, we were reminded of the need to be cautious in reaching general conclusions regarding the US situation. Because a few minutes after this discussion, Johanna Partin began her presentation by describing the coastal flooding likely to hit the city of San Francisco as a result of climate change. She explained that the likelihood of such flooding was the reason for the launch of a climate plan. Is the case of San Francisco an exception?
In fact, this apparent contradiction tells us more about the diversity of conditions in the US and differences in the perspective of the speakers. Stephen Wheeler is an “expert observer” who, in a retrospective analysis, sees no link between the launch of climate plans and natural catastrophes. Johanna Partin is an “expert activist” who is looking for ways to push through decisions and gain public backing. From her point of view, the likelihood of flooding—particularly for a coastal city—comes across as a potentially useful source of mobilization.
The session also brought out an area of convergence between Europe and the US: the climate plans begin with the establishment of an inventory of CO2 emissions for each specific area. The overall outcome of these inventories is at first sight surprising. We learned from Stephen Wheeler that the distribution of greenhouse gases in America in urban areas is broadly similar to that in French cities: in both cases, transportation accounts for around one third of total emissions. Here again, the average gives a simplistic picture of the diversity of the US situation. With San Francisco, the ratio is more consistent with our presuppositions about the US: road transportation in that city accounts for half of total emissions. To establish a “relevant” scale of observation on this subject, the San Francisco climate plan differentiates between emissions from local roads and emissions from regional roads. In the US, as in Europe, these greenhouse gas inventories, the first step in the plans, raise the question of scope and scale: how do you measure mobility-related emissions, since they are difficult to attribute to a particular scale or area? San Francisco has partially answered this question by basing its attribution on road type. However, it is an imperfect response, because this scope does not always match the city’s decisional range.
The presentations brought a second discovery. US climate plans do not leave the question of transportation and mobility completely out of the equation. Contrary to our expectations, mobility is represented in the climate plans in different ways and to different degrees. True, it is not at the forefront of objectives or future initiatives (see Stephen Wheeler’s article: State and Municipal Climate Change Plans: The First Generation, http://vem.typepad.com/files/state-and-municipal-climate-change-plans.pdf). Construction and renewable energy production are the first topics considered. The approach to mobility is clear but relatively atypical. So we find efforts to improve local authority vehicle fleets and to develop mass transit systems, but the plans also include measures that are relatively rare in Europe: regulations limiting vehicle emissions, incentives to convert corporate vehicle fleets, fuel substitution, etc. Sixteen US states have adopted California’s restrictive engine emission standards in their climate plans (with the aim of reducing CO2 emissions by 26% by 2016). The cities of Houston, Boston, Indianapolis and New York have announced measures to reduce CO2 emissions from vehicles or to develop biofuels.
The discussions also looked at what these climate plans tell us about changes in US perceptions of mobility.
This question, introduced into the debate by Pierre Radanne, attracted interest and comments from all the speakers. However, the answers and contributions did not give us a more accurate picture of the ways in which climate plans are or are not helping to change those perceptions. For some, these perceptions are being or could potentially be transformed under the pressure of public opinion, driven through advertising campaigns. For others, perceptions will evolve under the impact of natural catastrophes and the multiple risks of climate change (as mentioned above, there was not unanimity on this point amongst the speakers, panel members and the audience). So should climate plans warn of catastrophe in order to help to transform perceptions of mobility in the USA? Or should they be used more as instruments of communication in achieving that goal?
As regards communication, the two speakers were in agreement: the primary purpose of the climate plan is to raise local public awareness. For them, this is what provides the impetus to action. San Francisco is a good example: the way the head of the city’s climate plan markets the issue is based on action by the inhabitants themselves. Their actions, highlighted on the city’s website, operate on at least three registers. First, they are designed to draw attention and make the subject attractive. Next, they provide proof that action against climate change is possible and achievable (if my neighbor can do it, so can I). Finally, they provide proof that action is being taken and having an impact. The latter point is not measured in terms of climate change or the quantities of CO2 emissions avoided. Effectiveness is demonstrated by the fact that targets are converted into real action. This “proximity marketing” approach to climate plans introduces another dimension that is relatively rare in Europe. As a political document, the plan gains momentum through multiple projects enacted by local people. It is not simply a matter of translating its objectives into local policies or public initiatives. In a way, the climate plans become the “people’s climate action plans”.
However, the marketing process focuses more on energy than climate. Mobility plays a negligible role. The emphasis is on solar panels or energy-efficient buildings, and their impact on climate change is measured. There are no mobility initiatives on San Francisco’s website and in its inventory of achievements. Why is there no marketing around mobility and the car? Because it would be difficult to set up, if Mrs Partin is to be believed. As proof, she cites the very limited impact of San Francisco’s attempts to encourage inhabitants of the Bay Area to use park-and-ride schemes. Like the guests at the California session, Stephen Wheeler and Johanna Partin tended to describe incremental solutions that entail no in-depth transformation of the current mobility model. In the case of San Francisco—despite the active presence of militant ecologists—the climate plan is doing nothing to transform the American perception of mobility (put solar panels on my roof right now, no problem; but take away my car, let’s wait and see).
Another difference compared with France and Europe, the preparatory stage of these climate plans is not seen as a time to develop and raise awareness. In the US approach, awareness raising follows the development of an official climate plan, whereas in Europe cities are keen to demonstrate or generate large-scale local participation. In the US, climate plans are developed by the technical services in consultation with politicians. They are an opportunity to refine inventories and to list future initiatives. The final document is used to launch initiatives aimed at the public and city folk. More specifically, this document is used to gather under the climate umbrella long-standing or recent environmental actions conducted by local people and encouraged by municipalities. Climate change is used as a catalyst and vehicle of “publicization”, whilst benefiting from it.
Four other questions were raised, though not necessarily answered.
The first was about the connection between the different layers of climate plans, i.e. the State, the region and the city. Our contributors confirmed that such connections are rarely referred to. Cities either decide to follow the climate plan promulgated by the level above or to go their own way. For the moment, the rule seems often to be mutual disregard.
The second question was about the connection between climate plans and urban master plans and restrictive legislation. Here again, our contributors confirmed the lack of connection. Few climate plans aim to achieve their objectives through binding requirements. So in the USA, climate plans would seem to operate more like communal “reminders” on the issue. The priorities of States and Cities are elsewhere, even as regards the environment: reducing atmospheric pollution and the pollution of nature. The plans act as a sort of “background” process, a “backcloth” to more pressing and more active tasks. As a result, they are global but their aim is not to act horizontally, let alone in synergy with other plans (and local policies) as an instrument for combating climate change.
The last two questions were about two absentees from the climate plan process, which were expected to be there (especially in the US). Private firms are not involved in the development of these plans. They are referred to or mobilized on the fringes of the process. They are not present, for example, in California, despite the fact that the media are full of stories about their environmental commitments. Google, Yahoo! and their ilk, or the members of the various climate action groups (e.g. United States Climate Action Partnership) do not seem to be stakeholders in the process.
Similarly, there is little reference to technological innovation in these climate plans. The plans tend to be based on known and quickly accessible solutions. They do not seem to set much store by the spread of innovation, in particular in the sphere of mobility.
